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The "Protection of Lawful Commerce
in Arms Act": Immunity for the Firearm
Industry is a (Constitutional) Bulls-Eye
R. Clay Larkin'
INTRODUCTION
N late October 2005, while most political and legal observers concentrat-
ed on a flurry of headline-grabbing news from the Iraq War, the aftermath
of Hurricane Katrina, and the replacement of two Justices of the Supreme
Court, a landmark piece of tort reform legislation was passed by Congress
and signed into law by President Bush.' The law, known as the Protection
of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act ("PLCAA'), 3 prohibits "qualified civil
liability actions" against firearms manufacturers in state or federal courts.4
Congressional supporters, the White House, and firearms manufacturers
hailed the passage of the Act as an important step in the elimination of friv-
olous lawsuits aimed at holding firearms manufacturers liable when their
weapons were used in the commission of criminal acts.5 Opponents of the
firearms industry were as forceful in their criticism of the bill as supporters
were in offering praise, claiming the law would deprive municipalities and
gun violence victims of a necessary remedy for the injuries inflicted by the
violent use of firearms.6 Adding urgency to the controversy was a provision
of the Act requiring immediate dismissal of pending suits against gun mak-
ers in state and federal courts.7 Defendant firearms manufacturers in these
I J.D. expected 2007, University of Kentucky College of Law; B.A. 2004, Western
Kentucky University. The author wishes to thank Stephanie and his parents for their constant
love and encouragement.
2 Press Release, White House, Statement on S. 397, the "Protection of Lawful
Commerce in Arms" Act (Oct. 26, 2oo5), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releas-
es/2005/1o/20051026-i.html [hereinafter Press Release, S. 39 7].
3 Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 790-03 (West Supp.
2oo6).
4 Id.
5 See Bill Sargent, Shooting Interests Praise Act, FLA. TODAY, Oct. 28, 2OO5, at D2; Charlene
Carter & Seth Stern, S397-Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act, CONG. Q. BILLANALYSIS
(2005), 2005 WLNR 17714782; Press Release, S. 397.
6 See Lisa Friedman, Families Blast Gun-Act Vote: Kin of '99 Shooting Victims Say Makers
Shouldn't Be Shielded, DAILY NEWS OF L.A., Oct. 21, 2005, at N4; Timothy D. Lytton, Gun Billa
Messy Mix of Law, Politics, ALB. TMES UNION, Oct. 27, 2005, at A I3.
7 15 U.S.C.A. § 7902(b) (West Supp. 2oo6).
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suits immediately began moving for dismissal.8 Faced with the potential
loss of pending claims, plaintiffs and gun control groups began formulating
various challenges to the law.
Opponents of the Act alleged that it was unconstitutional in that it vio-
lates separation of powers between the legislature and the judiciary and
contradicts federalism principles governing the relationship between the
states and the federal government. 9 Specifically, section 7902(b) of the Act,
calling for the immediate dismissal of pending suits, was viewed as an en-
croachment on the power of the judiciary to decide cases. Furthermore, the
bill as a whole was viewed as contrary to principles of federalism by provid-
ing manufacturers with immunity under tort law, traditionally an area of
state concern.
This Note will focus on the challenges to the Act that are based on
separation of powers principles.' 0 Part I provides a brief history of litiga-
tion against the firearms industry, focusing primarily on the municipal and
crime-victim litigation that was the major impetus for the Act's passage,
and offers an overview of the provisions of the Act that have led to the
questioning of its constitutionality." Part II will examine the separation of
powers issue between the judiciary and the legislature that is implicated by
the law's requirement that courts dismiss pending suits.' Part III will focus
on the issue of whether the law is a valid exercise of congressional power
under the Commerce Clause) 3 Part III will also emphasize the importance
of court composition, both in the context of a case addressing the PLCAA's
constitutionality and on the Supreme Court, where the principal architects
of the "new federalism" jurisprudence have been replaced by newcomers.
Parts II and III will pay particular attention to two recent decisions which
examine the constitutionality of the PLCAA. These cases, City of New York
8 See William Freebairn, Gunmaker Seek Suit Dismissal, REPUBLICAN (Springfield, Mass.),
Oct. 29, 2005, at C7.
9 Peter Geier, Gun Bill is Law, But Will it Last? Critics Say Lawsuit Shield Will Not Stand Up
in Court, NAT'L L.J., Oct. 31, 2005, at 4 (noting potential Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment
due process challenges).
io While there are other controversies surrounding the law, most notably which particular
civil actions are covered by its grant of immunity, they are beyond the scope of this Note,
which will focus exclusively on the law's constitutionality in light of separation of powers
concerns. For a discussion of other possible constitutional challenges to the Act, see City of
New Yorkv. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 401 F. Supp. 2d z44 (E.D.N.Y. zoo5). See also Patricia Foster,
Comment, Good Guns (And Good Business Practices) Provide All the Protection They Need: Why
Legislation to Immunize the Gun Industry From Civil Liability is Unconstitutional, 72 U. CIN. L.
REV. 1739 (2004).
I I See infra notes 17-45 and accompanying text.
12 See infra notes 46-88 and accompanying text.
13 See infra notes 89-158 and accompanying text.
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v. Beretta USA Corp.4 and District of Columbia v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp,5 sup-
port the position of this Note that the law is constitutional. Part IV will fo-
cus on the applicability of the PLCAA to potential future efforts at federal
tort reform. 6
I. THE PROTECTION OF LAWFUL COMMERCE IN ARMS ACT
A. Background
As firearms have been involved in an extraordinary amount of violence and
crime in America, 7 it is only natural that some would come to view them
as a threat to society that must be controlled or eradicated. However, giv-
en that firearms require a user with some violent intent to actually inflict
any harm, coupled with the fact that gun ownership is a vibrant tradition
enshrined in the Constitution, s measures to control the use of firearms
or impose liability upon their manufacturers are particularly controversial.
There is certainly no doubt that the issue of how to deal with firearms has
"spawned a morass of litigation and debate."' 9
Attempts to recover for the costs of firearm-inflicted violence first
emerged in the 1970s and 1980s.10 During this time, plaintiffs had little
success with claims seeking to hold manufacturers liable under traditional
strict products liability principles."' However, in recent years courts have
become more receptive to other arguments, most notably those alleging
that manufacturers were liable for negligent marketing, or that particular
firearms constituted a public nuisance."2
In the 1990s, municipalities initiated litigation against the firearms
industry, primarily by alleging that the distribution of handguns in their
14 City of New York v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 401 E Supp. 2d z44 (E.D.N.Y. 2005).
15 District of Columbia v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., No. zooo CA 000428 B, zoo6 WL 1892023
(D.C. Super. Ct. May 22, 2oo6).
16 See infra notes 159-69 and accompanying text.
17 Timothy D. Lytton, Tort Claims Against Gun Manufacturers for Crime-Related Injuries:
Defining a Suitable Role for the Tort System in Regulating the Firearms Industry, 65 Mo. L. REV. 1,
3 (2000).
j8 U.S. CONST. amend. II.
19 David G. Owen, Inherent Product Hazards, 93 Ky. L.J. 377, 403 n.121 (2004) (cataloging
the extensive scholarly literature on the issue).
20 See id. at 404 (providing history of injury victim litigation against the firearm indus-
try).
z Patterson v. Rohm Gesellschaft, 6o8 F. Supp. 1zo6, 12o9 n.5 (N.D. Tex. 1985) (citing
numerous cases rejecting use of traditional strict products liability principles).
22 See Ileto v. Glock, Inc., 349 E3d 119* (9th Cir. 2003) (allowing claim of negligence and
public nuisance), cert. deniedsub nom. China North Indus. Corp. v. Ileto, 543 U.S. 1050 (zoos);
see also Johnson v. Bryco Arms, 304 E Supp. zd 383 (E.D.N.Y. 2004) (Weinstein, J.) (allowing
negligence and public nuisance claims).
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cities constituted a public nuisance. The basic premise is similar to that
adopted by the states in their claims against the tobacco industry: when an
industry's products inflict large social costs; governments should be able to
recoup some portion of the increased cost of social services from the indus-
try. 3 While many municipalities have been unsuccessful in these suits,2 4
some claims have withstood appeal."5
B. Legislative Response
As litigation over firearms increased, legislatures responded to the issue.
Some states began to limit the liability that could be imposed upon fire-
arms manufacturers, while in at least one locality, the ability of plaintiffs
to recover against manufacturers was aided by legislation . 6 Two bordering
governments passed laws displaying the divergence of legislative opinion
concerning lawsuits against gun makers. Virginia limited the ability of local
governments to bring suits against the gun industry, while retaining the
authority to do so in the commonwealth. 7 Legislation in the District of Co-
lumbia imposed absolute liability on gun manufacturers for injuries caused
by certain firearms. The D.C. assault weapons law" held manufacturers of
certain guns 9 "strictly liable in tort, without regard to fault or proof of de-
fect" for injuries proximately caused by a defined list of weapons. 30 While
the D.C. law nominally imposed "strict liability," allowing manufacturer
defendants the same defenses available in traditional strict liability ac-
tions," the law effectively imposed "absolute liability," as it required no
showing of product defect. While the statute seems to violate the basic
principle that product liability requires some proof of defectiveness, 32 the
D.C. Circuit nonetheless upheld the law on appeal.33 With various local
23 Owen, supra note 19, at 407 n.140 (citing cases where municipalities have instigat-
ed claims against gun manufacturers and dealers to recoup municipal costs associated with
guns).
24 Id.
25 Id. at407 n.141.
z6 See D.C. CODE ANN. § 7-2551.02 (LexisNexis 2oo6).
27 See VA. CODE ANN. § 15.2-915.1 (West zoo6).
28 See D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 7-2551.o1-.03 (LexisNexis 2oo6).
29 The "assault weapons" were described by manufacturer and model in the statute at
section 7-255 1.o, but could generally be described as "machine guns" or "assault weapons."
Included were guns known popularly as MAC io's, Uzis, and Kalishnikovs, among others.
30 D.C. CODE ANN. § 7-2551.02.
31 Id. § 7-2551.03.
32 See RESTATEMENT (TURD) OF ToRTs: PRODucTs LIABILITY § 1 (2004); David G. Owen,
Proof of Product Defect, 93 Ky. L.J. I (2004) ("Defectiveness lies at the center of products li-
ability law,").
33 District of Columbia v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 872 A.2d 633 (D.C. Cir. ) (en banc), cert.
denied, 126 S. Ct. 399 (2005).
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and state legislatures in disagreement over the issue, and the potential for
massive liability looming over manufacturers should other cities decide to
take the path pursued by the District of Columbia and endorsed by the
D.C. Circuit, Congress took action on the issue of civil liability for firearms
manufacturers.
C. Provisions of the Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act
The Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act begins with a list of
Congress's findings,' which support both the necessity of limiting liability
against firearm manufacturers3" and the constitutional authority of Congress
to pass such legislation.36 Congress claims that its authority to pass the law
is based on the Second Amendment37 and the Commerce Clause.38 Con-
gress also notes in the findings section that liability actions against the gun
industry threaten both that industry and others closely related thereto.39
The substantive "immunity" provision of the Act declares that "[a]
qualified civil liability action may not be brought in any Federal or State
court."' Any "qualified civil liability action that is pending on October 26,
2005, shall be immediately dismissed by the court in which the action was
brought or is currently pending."41 A "qualified civil liability action" is de-
fined as:
34 15 U.S.C.A. § 790i(a) (West Supp. zoo6).
35 Id. § 7901(a)(3), (5)-(8).
36 Id. § 790i(a)(I)--(2), (4).
37 It is arguable whether Congress is actually basing its authority to pass the law on the
Second Amendment, or whether its discussion of the Amendment was inserted into the bill to
show support for the principle of gun ownership. The discussion of the Second Amendment
within the Act is found in section 790i(a)(i) ("The Second Amendment to the United States
Constitution provides that the right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be in-
fringed."), id. § 7901(a)(I), and section 7901(a)(2) ("The Second Amendment to the United
States Constitution protects the rights of individuals, including those who are not members of
a militia or engaged in military service or training, to keep and bear arms."), id. § 790i(a)(2).
38 Commerce Clause authority for the legislation is more clearly explained in the find-
ings. See id. § 790 i(a)(5) ("Businesses in the United States that are engaged in interstate and
foreign commerce through the lawful design, marketing, distribution, importation, or sale to the
public of firearms or ammunition products that have been shipped or transported in interstate or
foreign commerce are not, and should not, be liable for the harm caused by those who criminally
or unlawfully misuse firearm products or ammunition products that function as designed and
intended.") (emphasis added); see also id. § 790 1(a)(6) ("The possibility of imposing liability
on an entire industry for harm that is solely caused by others is an abuse of the legal system ..
. invites the disassembly and destabilization of other industries and economic sectors lawfully
competing in the free enterprise system of the United States, and constitutes an unreasonable
burden on interstate andforeign commerce of the United States.") (emphasis added).
39 Id. § 790(a)(5)-(6).
40 Id. § 7902(a).
41 Id. § 7902(b).
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[A] civil action or proceeding or an administrative proceeding brought by
any person against a manufacturer or seller of a qualified product, or a trade
association, for damages, punitive damages, injunctive or declaratory relief,
abatement, restitution, fines, or penalties, or other relief, resulting from the
criminal or unlawful misuse of a qualified product by the person or a third
party .... 42
The immunity of the gun industry under the provisions of the statute
is limited only to those suits in which the plaintiff's injury was caused by
some misuse of firearms. Therefore, many traditional claims against manu-
facturers remain available.43 Senator Larry Craig, the sponsor of the Sen-
ate's version of the Act, noted that the actions barred were limited in scope
and that the law did not excuse the gun industry from liability for negligent
or criminal conduct or from traditional products liability claims.' Defining
what constitutes a "qualified civil liability action" under the Act remains
the job of the courts, and, to this point, the courts are conflicted as to which
actions are barred by the Act.4" The battle over the scope of the statute will
continue to be a source of ongoing debate and litigation. However, at this
early stage, opponents of the statute will also continue to challenge the
statute's constitutionality. The provisions of the statute most relevant to
these constitutional challenges are section 7902(b), which directs the out-
come of pending actions, and the findings in section 7901, which support
Congress's power to legislate in the area of tort law.
II. JUDICIAL-LEGISLATIVE SEPARATION OF POWERS CHALLENGE
As noted above, section 7902(b) extends the reach of the statute's immu-
nity provisions to cover pending lawsuits. This section's order to all courts
to dismiss any action currently pending has been criticized as an encroach-
42 Id. § 7903(5)(A).
43 Id. § 7903(5)(A)(i)-(vi) (outlining the actions still available, which include those for
negligent entrustment, any action alleging a knowing violation of federal or state law by the
defendant, warranty actions, and traditional products liability actions based on negligence or
defectiveness in design or manufacture).
44 "It is not the gun industry immunity bill. It is important that we say that and say it
again because it does not protect firearms or ammunitions manufacturers ... from any law-
suits based on their own negligence or criminal conduct. This bill gives specific examples
of lawsuits not prohibited. Let me repeat, not prohibited: Product liability... negligence or
negligent entrustment, breach of contract, lawsuits based on a violation of State and Federal
law ... we think it is very clear." 151 CONG. REC. $9o65 (daily ed. July 27, 2005) (statement
of Sen. Craig).
45 Compare New York v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 4o E Supp. 2d 244 (E.D.N.Y. 2oo5) (hold-
ing that New York City's suit against gun manufacturers may proceed despite the Act because
the city's claim for abatement of a public nuisance was not a "qualified civil immunity action"
under the Act), with Ileto v. Glock, Inc., 421 F. Supp. 2d 1274 (C.D. Cal. 2oo6) (finding that
claims of negligent marketing and public nuisance are barred by the PLCAA).
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ment on the power of the judiciary.' However, a proper understanding of
the separation of powers between Congress and the judiciary will demon-
strate that section 7902(b)'s call for immediate dismissal is constitutional.
A discussion of the limits on Congress's power to infringe upon the
power of the judiciary must begin with the Reconstruction-era case of
United States v. Klein,4 7 which has become synonymous with limitations on
Congress's power relative to the judiciary. While the facts of the case are
complicated, they are essentially as follows: during the Civil War, Congress
passed a law requiring that any property captured or abandoned as Union
forces advanced into the South be sold and the proceeds paid to the U.S.
government." The Confiscation Act also provided that any southerner who
had his property seized and sold pursuant to the Act could recover the pro-
ceeds in an action in the Federal Court of Claims upon a showing of loyalty
to the Union.49 The Supreme Court subsequently held in the case of United
States v. Padeforda0 that a presidential pardon was sufficient proof of loyalty
to allow for recovery of confiscated property under the Act. Congress then
passed a law explicitly overruling the holding in Padelford and directing
courts to no longer accept presidential pardons as proof of loyalty.5 This
new law went even further, by declaring that a pardon would actually be-
come proof of disloyalty to the union, and be cause for immediate dismissal
of an action in which a pardon was presented as evidence.5" In addition to
directing the result of cases in the Court of Claims, the statute stripped the
Supreme Court of the jurisdiction to hear appeals in these cases.53
This statute was held unconstitutional in Klein. The Supreme Court
held that Congress had encroached upon the power of the judiciary to de-
cide cases by dictating how the court must decide and interpret evidence
presented to it.-4 While acknowledging that Congress had authority to con-
trol the jurisdiction of federal courts, the Klein Court noted that once this
46 See Jean Macchiaroli Eggen & John G. Culhane, Public Nuisance Claims Against Gun
Sellers: New Insights and Challenges, 38 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 1, 45 (2004); Ryan VanGrack,
Recent Development, The Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act, 41 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 541,
541-42 (2004) (both discussing PLCAA bill that was not passed in 2004).
47 United States v. Klein, 8n U.S. 128 (1871).
48 Abandoned Property Collection Act, ch. 120, 12 Stat. 8zo (1863) (hereinafter referred
to as the Confiscation Act).
49 Id.
50 United States v. Padelford, 76 U.S. 531 ( 1869), superseded by statute, Act of July 12, 1870,
16 Stat. 230, 235, as recognized in San Carlos Apache Tribe v. Superior Court, 972 P.2d I79 (Ariz.
1999)
51 Ch. 251, 16 Stat. at 235.
52 Id.
53 Id.
54 United States v. Klein, 8o U.S. 128, 146-47 (1869).
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jurisdiction was given, Congress could not attempt to control the outcome
of particular cases."5
Perhaps due to its "excessively broad and ambiguous statements," Klein
has been "viewed as nearly all things to all men." 6 Invoked in nearly every
decision delineating the limits of congressional control over the judiciary,
Klein is rarely held to be directly controlling.5 7 Interpretations of this foun-
dational case are diverse. 8 Given the archaic and ambiguous language of
the Klein holding, 9 determining the controlling principles of judicial-con-
gressional separation of powers is best accomplished through a review of
more recent cases interpreting the Klein holding and outlining its contours.
An examination of recent Supreme Court cases on the subject demonstrates
that the Klein holding is reserved for instances of egregious overreaching
by Congress, and not for laws which simply direct courts to take certain
actions, especially when underlying law is changed in connection with the
order to the courts, as is the case with the Protection of Lawful Commerce
in Arms Act.
Robertson v. Seattle Audubon Society held that Klein was inapplicable in
cases where Congress had changed the underlying substantive law.60 In
Robertson, environmental groups had filed lawsuits challenging logging in
national parks that were the habitat of the endangered spotted owl. 61 At-
tempting to settle the dispute between environmental and logging inter-
ests, Congress amended certain environmental statutes to allow harvest-
ing in certain areas but preventing it in others. 6 This "Northwest Timber
Compromise" changed laws governing the legality of timber sales in cer-
tain affected areas. 63 Specifically, it amended certain sections in each of
the laws to conform with the demands of the environmentalists in lawsuits
pending against the Forest Service. 64 Then, Congress included a provision
55 Id. at 146.
56 Gordon G. Young, Congressional Regulation of Federal Courts' Jurisdiction and Processes:
United States v. Klein Revisited, 1981 Wis. L. REV. I 189, 1195 (1981).
57 Lawrence G. Sager, Kleins First Principle: A Proposed Solution, 86 GEo. L.J. 2525,
2525 (1998) ("Klein typically is invoked as good law but not applicable to the case before the
Court.").
58 See Amy D. Ronner, Judicial Self-Demise: The Test of When Congress Impermissibly Intrudes
on Judicial Power After Robertson v. Seattle Audubon Society and the Federal Appellate Courts'
Rejection of the Separation of Powers Challenges to the New Section of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, 35 ARiz. L. REV. 1037, 1046 (1993); Young, supra note 56, at 12 18-19, 122 1.
59 For a discussion of the difficulty of interpreting the Klein holding, see Sager, supra
note 57; see also Nat'l Coal. To Save Our Mall v. Norton, 269 E3d 1092, 1o96 (D.C. Cir. zoo0)
("Klein's exact meaning is far from clear.").
60 Robertson v. Seattle Audubon Soc'y, 503 U.S. 429, 441 (1992).
61 Id. at431-32.
62 Id. at 432.
63 Id. at 433.
64 Id. at 434-35.
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declaring that the changes in the law were adequate consideration to sat-
isfy the requirements of these lawsuits. 65 While this section spoke in terms
of directing particular outcomes in pending cases, a unanimous Supreme
Court found that it did not violate the principle of Klein because Congress
had changed substantive law, and had not directed the courts to find a par-
ticular result under existing law.'
Robertson thus stands for the proposition that no Klein violation will be
found when Congress changes underlying law. This is perhaps the most
settled understanding of the Klein Rule.67 Congress is free to direct certain
outcomes if, in doing so, it merely requires courts to interpret newly ap-
plicable law rather than old.68 This was the case in Robertson, where Con-
gress simply provided the courts with a change in statute and specified that
these new provisions were to be followed. When Congress makes changes
to underlying law and directs the courts to follow, even when speaking
in terms which suggest some encroachment on the judiciary by "direct-
ing" outcomes of pending cases, it does not violate the separation of pow-
ers principles articulated in Klein. Congress begins encroaching on judicial
power when it attempts to control how courts interpret laws, rather than
just changing the law.69 This was noted in Robertson, where the Court found
no interference with judicial fact-finding or statutory interpretation.7"
The case of Millerv. French is another example of an unsuccessful Klein
challenge." In Miller, the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 199572 was chal-
lenged as directing courts to reach a particular outcome because it allowed
states to petition for immediate termination of prospective injunctions that
had arisen in civil actions challenging prison conditions. Of particular con-
cern was a provision in the Act requiring that all such injunctive relief be
narrowly tailored.73 If the injunctions did not meet this new legal standard,
immediate relief could be sought.7 4 The Court found no violation of the
Klein Rule because the underlying law-the standard to be used in the
granting of an injunction-was changed.7 5 As the Court noted, "[riather
65 Id. at 435.
66 Id. at 441.
67 See Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 218 (1995) ("Whatever the precise
scope of Klein, however, later decisions have made clear that its prohibition does not take hold
when Congress 'amends applicable law."' (citing Robertson, 503 U.S. at 441)).
68 See Lloyd C. Anderson, Congressional Control Over the Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts: A
New Threat to James Madison's Compromise, 39 BRANDEIS L.J. 417, 446 (2000).
69 See United States v. Klein, 8o U.S. 128, 146 (869).
70 Robertson, 503 U.S. at 439.
71 See generally Miller v. French, 530 U.S. 327 (2000).
72 Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 18 U.S.C. § 3626 (2ooo).
73 Id. § 3626(b)(2).
74 Id. § 3626(b)(2); seealso Benjamin v. Jacobson, 124 F3d 162, 166 (2d Cir. 1997), vacated
on reh'g, 172 F3d 144 (2d Cir. 1999) (en banc).
75 Miller 530 U.S. at 349.
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than prescribing a rule of decision, § 3626(e)(2) simply imposes the conse-
quences of the court's application of the new legal standard."
7 6
Under the statutes at issue in Robertson and Miller, the courts were still
given the power to decide cases. Courts retain a similar power under sec-
tion 7902(b) of the Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act (PLCAA).
Courts are ordered only to dismiss "qualified civil liability actions," 7 but
retain the power to determine what a "qualified civil liability action" is.
Courts are not required to dismiss every suit with a gun-maker as defen-
dant, but only those which fall within section 7903's definition of "qualified
civil liability actions." As courts under the Act are left with their power to
interpret the statute and decide cases accordingly, section 7092(b) "sim-
ply imposes the consequences of the court's application of the new legal
standard. ' 78 In this way, it is little more than a rhetorical flourish on the
statute, adding emphasis to Congress's point that it is not fond of frivolous
lawsuits against the gun industry.79 A court following the remainder of the
statute would proceed in exactly the same manner whether section 7902(b)
existed or not. It would examine the civil action before it, determine if it
met the terms of section 7903, and if it did, the case would be dismissed. As
the statute clearly states that "a qualified civil immunity action may not be
brought,""0 the court would only be left with the possibility of dismissing
the suit. Therefore, section 7902(b) is perhaps an unnecessary provision,
but certainly not fatal to the law's constitutionality.
To date, the decisions interpreting the constitutionality of the Act in
light of a Klein challenge support this analysis. In City of New York v. Be-
retta USA Corp., the defendant gun manufacturers moved for immediate
dismissal of the City's action against them, arguing that the case repre-
sented the type of action which the Act was intended to cover.8 While
the court eventually found that the City's lawsuit against the defendant
was not within the scope of the Act,8" it nonetheless held that the Act was
constitutional.83 The court was entirely unpersuaded by the plaintiff's ar-
gument that the PLCAA was unconstitutional as a violation of the Klein
rule because it "direct[ed] the ultimate decision in pending cases."' Citing
76 Id.
77 15 U.S.C.A. § 7902(b) (West Supp. 2006).
78 Miller, 530 U.S. at 349.
79 151 CONG. REC. S9o65 (daily ed. July 27, 2005) (statement of Sen. Craig).
8o § 7902.
81 City of New York v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 401 F Supp. zd 244, 258 (E.D.N.Y. 2005)
(Weinstein, J.).
82 Id. at 271 (holding that the claim against the defendant manufacturers fell within the
PLCAA's exception for actions involving a claim that the manufacturer knowingly violated a
federal or state law).
83 Id. at z8o.
84 Id. at 292.
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Millerv. French, the court held that the PLCAA "imposes a 'new legal stan-
dard' that is not restricted to pending cases."'85 The court also noted that the
PLCAA, in marked contrast to Klein, left the courts the power to perform
their traditional roles of fact-finding and statutory interpretation.86 While
the final outcome of the New York municipal gun litigation is uncertain,
87
and a final resolution of this issue of constitutionality most likely awaits
the determination of the Second Circuit and possibly the Supreme Court,
Beretta persuasively supports the position that the law does not violate the
separation of powers between Congress and the judiciary and therefore
supports the constitutionality of the PLCAA.88
III. FEDERALISM CHALLENGES
A. Commerce Clause
1. Background-Recent Commerce Clause Cases.-All congressional legisla-
tion must be founded on some grant of power contained in the Constitu-
tion. One constitutional provision frequently used to support congressional
regulation is the Commerce Clause.89 The Commerce Clause was used
through much of the mid- to late-twentieth century to provide a consti-
tutional basis for congressional regulation in a wide array of areas. 90 The
findings in the PLCAA demonstrate that the Commerce Clause was relied
upon as a source of congressional power to enact that legislation. 91 Prior to
1995, the fact that a statute was premised upon Congress's commerce pow-
er would have virtually assured that the federal legislature had acted within
the proper scope of its power.9" However, the Supreme Court's holding in
85 Id at 293.
86 Id.
87 Id. at 298 ("[S]ince the Act, is said by defendants to affect suits pending across the na-
tion, and its interpretation is an issue of first impression, raising possible constitutional ques-
tions, a temporary discretionary stay is granted."). Butsee City of New York v. Beretta U.S.A.
Corp., 413 F Supp. 2d I8o, 182 (E.D.N.Y. zoo6) (withdrawing stay while trial court considers
new motion to dismiss the case based on legislation passed prior to issuance of court's original
decision but not brought to court's attention until after stay was granted).
88 The constitutionality of the statute was also upheld against a Klein challenge in Distrct
of Columbia v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., No. 2000 CA 000428 B, 2006 WL 1892023, at *13 (D.C.
Super. Ct. May 22, 2oo6). There, the court cited to City of New York v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp.
as well as Miller and Robertson in holding that the statute was not an encroachment on the
judiciary. Id.
89 U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
90 See Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 257 (1964) (upholding Title
II of the Civil Rights Act on Commerce Clause grounds); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. I I 1,
128-29 (1942) (upholding law regulating personal cultivation and consumption of wheat as
properly premised on Commerce Clause authority).
91 15 U.S.C.A. § 790i(a) (West Supp. 2oo6).
92 See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES § 3.3.5
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
United States v. Lopez required a reconsideration of the extent of Congress's
power under the Commerce Clause.9
The Supreme Court found the Gun-Free Schools Act at issue in Lopez
94
to be an unconstitutional exercise of congressional power under the Com-
merce Clause. The Court found the Act deficient in several respects. First,
the Court found that the statute had "nothing to do with 'commerce' or
any sort of economic enterprise, however broadly one might define those
terms."95 Next, the Court criticized the absence of any specific findings in
the statute or legislative history indicating that gun possession in a school
zone affected interstate commerce. 96 Finally, the Court, in full display of
the federalism principles underlying its decision, noted that if the govern-
ment's justification for federal regulation in the area of gun possession in
a school zone was upheld, it would be "difficult to perceive any limitation
on federal power, even in areas such as criminal law enforcement or educa-
tion where States historically have been sovereign."" The holding in Lopez
essentially established three major requirements for legislation passed pur-
suant to Commerce Clause authority: that the subject of the legislation be
"economic" in nature, that Congress provide specific evidence of an effect
on interstate commerce, and that the legislation not interfere in an area of
traditional state authority.
In 2000, the Court was faced with another congressional attempt to reg-
ulate criminal behavior. In United State v. Morrison,98 the Court responded
in much the same way it had in Lopez, invalidating the law on Commerce
Clause grounds.99 Concerned with the result in Lopez, and hoping to bol-
ster the connection between the law and interstate commerce, °° Congress
(1997) ("Between 1936 and April 26, 1995, the Supreme Court did not find one federal law
unconstitutional as exceeding the scope of Congress's commerce power.").
93 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549,561 (1995)
94 The Gun-Free Schools Act, 104 Stat. 4844 (previously codified at 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)
(1988)), invalidated by Lopez, 514 U.S 549. This law made illegal the possession of a firearm "in
or on the grounds of, a public, parochial or private school" or "within a distance of 1,ooo feet
from the grounds of a public, parochial or private school." Id. § 921(a)(25).
95 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561.
96 Id. at 562.
97 Id. at 564.
98 United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 613 (zooo).
99 Congressional authority to pass the law at issue inMorrison was also based on Congress's
enforcement power under section five of the Fourteenth Amendment, which has also been
put forth as a potential ground for congressional authority to enact the PLCAA. However, the
case for the PLCAA's constitutionality under the Commerce Clause is so strong that reliance
on section five as grounds for congressional authority is unnecessary. Congressional authority
for the PLCAA under section five was discussed in New York v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., where the
court found that section five was likely an unconstitutional basis for congressional authority in
passing the PLCAA but was unnecessary in light of the Commerce Clause power.
oo Morrison, 529 U.S. at 614 ("In contrast with the lack of congressional findings that we
faced in Lopez, § 13981 is supported by numerous findings regarding the serious impact that
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prepared a more detailed record of findings in passing the law at issue in
Morrison.'0' However, the Court once again found the connection between
the regulated activity and interstate commerce too attenuated. 02 The deci-
sion in Morrison also emphasized that the activity being regulated must be
economic in nature if Congress expected the Court to show deference to its
decision to regulate under the Commerce Clause. This reasoning led the
Court to hold that activities of traditional state concern, such as criminal
law enforcement, cannot become subject to federal regulation simply be-
cause they have an "aggregate affect" on interstate commerce.103
The most recent Commerce Clause decision signaled a retreat from Lo-
pez and Morrison by showing more deference to congressional power. Gon-
zalez v. Raich'0° upheld the constitutionality of the Controlled Substances
Act (CSA) 0° against a challenge alleging that the law was unconstitutional
as applied to users of medical marijuana. But rather than changing substan-
tially the holdings in Lopez and Morrison, Gonzalez was distinguished from
those cases on its facts. First, the challenge in Gonzalez was only that the
CSA was unconstitutional when applied to a select group, not that Con-
gress lacked authority to regulate illegal drugs.'6Additionally, the Court
distinguished the statutes in Morrison and Lopez because they regulated
purely non-economic activity. The statute in Gonzalez regulated a com-
modity for which there is a known, albeit illegal, market that is national in
character. 07
2. Applying the Court's Commerce Clause Precedent to the PLCAA.-In light of
these recent federalism cases, the PLCAA must follow one of two paths to
be considered a valid exercise of congressional Commerce Clause power.
First, the PLCAA could be viewed as a statute similar to the CSA upheld in
Gonzalez-that is, a law regulating a commodity that is bought and sold in
interstate commerce. This would allow the more deferential "aggregate ef-
gender-motivated violence has on victims and their families.").
1oi Violence Against Women Act, 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (2000) (providing a civil remedy in
federal court for victims of gender-motivated violence).
102 Morrison, 529 U.S. at 615.
103 Id. at 617-18 ("We accordingly reject the argument that Congress may regulate non-
economic, violent criminal conduct based solely on that conduct's aggregate effect on inter-
state commerce. The Constitution requires a distinction between what is truly national and
what is truly local.").
104 Gonzalez v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (zoo5).
105 Controlled Substances Act, 84 Stat. 1242 (1970) (codified in numerous sections of 2 1
U.S.C. beginning at § 8oi).
1o6 Raich, 545 U.S. at 15.
107 Id. at 25-26 ("Unlike those at issue in Lopez and Morrison, the activities regulated by
the CSA are quintessentially economic .... The CSA is a statute that regulates the production,
distribution, and consumption of commodities for which there is an established, and lucrative,
interstate market.").
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fect" test used in Gonzalez to be applied to the findings Congress presented
to justify the regulation of civil liability actions against firearms manufac-
turers, and likely lead to the PLCAA being upheld. However, such an ap-
proach is unlikely, as the PLCAA does not regulatefirearms as a commodity,
but instead regulates lawsuits that concern firearms.
While the deferential standard of review of congressional regulation of
commodities and instrumentalities of commerce is likely not available for
the PLCAA, the law does regulate an activity that is economic in nature.
Civil liability actions appear to be "economic" in nature, as they either
involve money damages or at least affect the economic condition of any
defendants found liable. It is clear from the language of the statute that
Congress intended for the PLCAA to be an "economic" regulation. The
findings section of the statute notes that the regulated lawsuits "seek mon-
ey damages," ' and threaten to "destabiliz[e] ... industries and economic
sectors lawfully competing in the free enterprise system of the United
States, and constitute an unreasonable burden on the interstate and foreign
commerce of the United States.'109 These findings support the contention
that the activity regulated by the PLCAA is economic in nature, and thus
Congress's authority to pass the statute should be given deference under
recent Commerce Clause decisions.
In addition to being concerned with an economic activity, the rigorous
and federalism-oriented approach to the Commerce Clause articulated by
the Court in Morrison and Lopez requires that Commerce Clause legislation
apply only to interstate activity. The lack of such a limitation doomed the
law at issue in Lopez to failure.'10 The PLCAA limits its scope to only those
actions against defendants who are engaged in interstate or international
commerce.'
1
'
The Court in Lopez and Morrison also emphasized the importance of
congressional findings to support the connection between the legislation
and interstate commerce." ' The text of the PLCAA and its legislative his-
tory are replete with specific findings that the lawsuits regulated by the
IO8 15 U.S.C.A. § 790i(a)(3) (West Supp. 2006).
i9 Id. § 7901 (a)(6).
i i1 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549,561 (1995) ("§922(q) contains no jurisdictional
element which would ensure, through case-by-case inquiry, that the firearm possession in
question affects interstate commerce.").
iii See id. § 7903(4) (defining a "qualified product" for the purposes of the act as "a
firearm ... that has been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce"); see also §
7903(2) (defining the "manufacturer" of a "qualified product" as "a person who is engaged in
the business of manufacturing the product in interstate or foreign commerce....").
11z See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 563 ("To the extent that congressional findings would enable
us to evaluate the legislative judgment that the activity in question substantially affected in-
terstate commerce, even though no such substantial effect was visible to the naked eye, they
are lacking here."); see also United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 614-15 (zooo) (discussing
the importance of congressional findings in Commerce Clause legislation).
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PLCAA have an effect on interstate commerce." 3 While "the existence of
congressional findings is not sufficient, by itself, to sustain the constitution-
ality of Commerce Clause legislation,""' 4 the PLCAA does contain find-
ings supporting the legislation, thus making it superior to the legislation
involved in Lopez.
Furthermore, the causal connection between the activity regulated by
the PLCAA and interstate commerce is direct. The current municipality
litigation puts the firearm industry at risk for massive financial liability.
Therefore, the activity regulated has a direct effect on the economic condi-
tions of an industry; if the lawsuits succeed, firearms manufacturers will be
financially harmed. The findings in Morrison relied on a more complicated
chain of events to make the connection between gender-motivated vio-
lence and interstate commerce." 5 The distinction between the causal chain
in Morrison and the more direct connection between the regulation of law-
suits against gun makers and interstate commerce was noted in the Beretta
court's discussion of the Commerce Clause's application to the PLCAA." 6
Finally, the constitutionality of Congress's exercise of the Commerce
Clause power by Congress in enacting the PLCAA is supported by the
"national" character of the activity it seeks to regulate. A recurrent theme
in the recent Commerce Clause decisions is that limitations on Congress's
power to legislate under the Commerce Clause are necessary in order to
preserve the balance of power in the federal system."7 By limiting Con-
gress's power to regulate only in matters that are "truly national," while
reserving to the states those powers which are "truly local," the Court has
certainly sought to preserve state autonomy and sovereignty in the federal
system."' Under this local-national dichotomy, the extent to which federal
legislation regulating the civil justice system, such as the PLCAA, will be
upheld as constitutional depends in large part on whether the subject of
regulation is perceived to be primarily local or national in nature.
'13 See § 7901(6); seealso 151 CONG. REc. S9o87,9o7 (daily ed. July 27, 2005) (statement
of Sen. Baucus) ("[Tihe time, expense, and effort that goes into defending these nuisance
suits is a significant drain on the firearms industry, costing jobs and millions of dollars, in-
creasing business operating costs ... and threatening to put dealers and manufacturers out of
business.").
1 14 Morrison, 529 U.S. at 614.
1 15 Id. at 615 (The connection, in the Court's words, has only an "attenuated effect upon
interstate commerce." Because gender-aimed crime is a subset of crime in general, if it is
deemed sufficient to invoke Congress's commerce power, any crime, in theory, would be suf-
ficient.).
i16 See City of New York v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 401 F. Supp. 2d 244, 285-86 (E.D.N.Y.
2005).
1 17 See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 552 ("[A] healthy balance of power between the States and the
Federal Government will reduce the risk of tyranny and abuse from either front." (quoting
Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 ( 99 ))); see also Morrison, 529 U.S. at 620-22.
i 18 See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 552.
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Critics of federal regulation of the tort system will argue that laws such
as the PLCAA interfere with an area of the law traditionally reserved to
the states. Whether tort law is in fact an area of exclusive state concern de-
pends on how one views the purpose of tort law."9 If torts are exclusively a
form of "corrective justice," more akin to criminal law and similar "moral"
legislation, then they are state and local concerns; whereas, if torts are sim-
ply an economic issue, the case for federalization becomes stronger.' Of
course, most torts are not obviously moral or economic in nature, but an
amalgamation of the two approaches, seeking both to increase social eco-
nomic efficiency and redress past wrongs. Therefore, classifying a law such
as the PLCAA as a tort reform measure does not automatically implicate an
area of traditional state concern, nor does it remove it from such scrutiny. 2'
Instead, the law will be treated as any other piece of legislation predicated
on Commerce Clause authority. The Court will engage in a typical federal-
ism analysis, looking to ensure that the law regulates an economic activity
that significantly affects interstate commerce.
Under most of the new federalism decisions, the Court has examined
both the purposes and effects of federal laws to determine if the activity
regulated is truly "national" and "economic" in nature.' 2 For example, in
Morrison, the Court determined that the purpose of the law at issue was to
deter violence against women and compensate victims of such violence,
not to regulate interstate commerce.2 3 The underlying purpose of the law,
therefore, was the punishment of immoral and violent activity, closely akin
to criminal or "moral" legislation. Such law has traditionally been the ex-
clusive realm of the states. 1 4 In contrast, the PLCAA intends to support the
gun industry against what Congress perceives as potentially ruinous liabil-
ity. The PLCAA's findings and legislative history support the conclusion
119 Whether laws such as the PLCAA that provide immunity from suit for certain indus-
tries are in fact "tort reform" or just economic protection for particular industries is far from
clear. Since torts are of a decidedly less national character than the industries these reform
measures support, the case for their constitutionality as tort reform measures makes the case
for their constitutionality as regulations of an industry even stronger.
I2o Betsy J. Grey, The New Federalism Jurisprudence and National Tort Reform, 59 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 475, 535-36 (2002) (proposing a sliding-scale approach for evaluating federal tort
reform measures, which would afford the federal government a greater role in those tort laws
based primarily on economics and give states more authority in dealing with those torts that
are "moral" in nature).
12 1 See id. at 526 (discussing the use of the Commerce Clause as a basis for federal tort
reform legislation and noting that such legislation has never been declared unconstitutional
under the Clause, but also noting that there has never been a serious challenge to federal tort
reform under the Court's "new federalism jurisprudence").
122 Id. at 529-30.
123 United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
124 See id. at 618 ("The regulation and punishment of intrastate violence that is not di-
rected at the instrumentalities, channels, or goods involved in interstate commerce has always
been the province of the States.").
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that it was the financial stability of the firearms industry that propelled the
legislation forward." 5 The lawsuits that the Act bans are concerned with
recouping economic damages to fund the perceived financial effects of gun
violence."2 6 There is no moral issue involved, thus the realm of traditional
state power is not implicated. The economic purposes and effects of the
PLCAA and the fact that it affects an industry that is inherently nation-
al supports the conclusion that it is a valid exercise of Commerce Clause
power.
B. Tenth Amendment
In two prominent cases from the 1990s, the Supreme Court began to
use the Tenth Amendment" 7 to create an area of exclusive state sovereignty
upon which the federal government could not encroach.2 8 This approach
has been controversial, as many scholars believe the Tenth Amendment
is simply a "reminder that Congress only may legislate if it has authority
under the Constitution."'2 9 While the debate over the precise meaning of
the provision continues, 3 ' what is clear is that the impact of the Supreme
Court's decisions creates the issue of potential constitutional infirmity
when Congress intrudes on an area traditionally of state concern. While
the discussion above' 3' has already concluded that the PLCAA does not
intrude on an area of state concern, at least as far as that concept has been
explained in the Commerce Clause cases, opponents of the law could still
point to the Tenth Amendment as a possible challenge to the law's consti-
tutionality. 32 However, a quick examination of the relevant precedent will
show that the Tenth Amendment does not provide a proper basis for chal-
lenging this particular law.
The revival of the use of the Tenth Amendment to invalidate federal
legislation began in New York v. United States.1 33 The facts of New York are
somewhat complicated,'34 but its holding is relatively straightforward: Con-
125 See supra notes 34-39.
126 See 15 U.S.C.A. § 7901(5)-(6) (West Supp. 2006).
127 U.S. CONsT. amend. X ("The powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to
the people.").
1z8 See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997); New York v. United States, 505
U.S. 144, 149 (1992).
129 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 92, § 3.8.
130 See id.
131 See supra notes 89-158.
132 See generally CHEMERINSKY, supra note 92, § 3.8.
133 New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144.
134 New York v. United States concerned a challenge to the Low-Level Radioactive Waste
Policy Act. Under the Act, states which failed to provide for disposal of radioactive wastes
were required to "take title" to those wastes. The Court reasoned that the "take title" pro-
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gress cannot force states to legislate when Congress can deal with the sub-
ject of the legislation through its own power. 35 Forcing the states to act is
known as "commandeering" the states, and is an encroachment on their
power as sovereign entities under the federal system. 13 6
Similar to New York v. United States, Printz v. United States'37 concerned
the "commandeering" of state government to carry out a federal program.
Printz invalidated portions of the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act
that required state and local law enforcement officers to perform back-
ground checks on potential gun purchasers. 38 The Brady Act requirement
that the state executive officers carry out a federal program was viewed as
commandeering the state government in violation of the Tenth Amend-
ment.
139
The commandeering cases outlined above present the most aggressive
use of the Tenth Amendment to invalidate otherwise sound congressio-
nal legislation as an unconstitutional encroachment upon state sovereignty.
The Court's ability to strike down congressional action under the Tenth
Amendment is likely limited to those cases closely analogous to New York
and Printz, specifically those in which Congress "commandeers" the legis-
lative or executive functions of the state government.
The PLCAA does not involve any commandeering of the state govern-
ments. It does not require that any branch of any state government take any
action. It merely requires that the states refrain from entertaining certain
lawsuits. While the Act may preclude state courts from entertaining law-
suits that could otherwise be brought in state courts, it does not intrude on
state sovereignty. Rather, the Act requires that federal legislation be given
preeminence over state law, a position consistent with existing federal au-
thority under the Supremacy Clause.4 ° Therefore, the Tenth Amendment
likely presents no significant barrier to the Act's constitutionality. This was
the view adopted in City of New York v. Beretta USA Corp. Discussing poten-
tial federalism challenges under both the Tenth and Eleventh"' Amend-
visions of the Act forced state legislatures to pass certain laws, therefore "commandeering"
the state legislative process to achieve federal goals. This "commandeering" intruded on the
states' sovereign power to legislate. Under this approach, Congress was free to pass legislation
penalizing states for failure to dispose of radioactive wastes, or to pass federal law dealing with
radioactive waste disposal, but it could not force states to address the problem through their
own laws. See id. at 175-77.
135 Id. at 166.
136 Id. at 174.
137 Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 0997).
138 Id. at 933.
139 Id. at 924.
140 U.S. CONsT. art. VI, § 1, cl. 2.
141 U.S. CONsT. amend. XI ("The judicial power of the United States shall not be con-
strued to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the
United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.").
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ments, the Beretta court stated simply that the amendments were not "ap-
plicable to the present case, and do not determine the constitutionality of
the Act." ' a The absence of any commandeering of the states by the Act
was specifically cited as the reason the Act did not implicate the Tenth
Amendment.
143
This review of recent Commerce Clause and Tenth Amendment prece-
dent as applied to the PLCAA demonstrates that the Act does not run afoul
of the Supreme Court's federalism jurisprudence. The subject of the legis-
lation is national and economic in character. Similarly, it does not run afoul
of the "commandeering" proscribed by the Tenth Amendment cases.
C. The Importance of Court Composition
The decision in City of New York v. Beretta USA Corp. is significant not only
because it is the first case to address the constitutionality of the PLCAA,
but also because it was authored by an expert on mass tort cases, Judge
Jack Weinstein. Having written on the subject of mass torts and the need
to federalize the tort system" and having presided over important torts
cases,145 Weinstein's opinion is certainly authoritative. Bringing his exper-
tise in the area to bear on the decision, Beretta is incredibly lengthy and
detailed, building an immense factual background of the Act and the his-
tory of firearm litigation over its nearly 100 pages. This is significant in two
respects. Judge Weinstein has been criticized as being overly solicitous of
claims against the gun industry'" and has in at least one case entertained
novel claims against the industry. 147 With a perceived opponent of the gun
This Note does not discuss the Eleventh Amendment because the Amendment is only impli-
cated when a law purports to abrogate a state's sovereign immunity from suit. As the PLCAA
does not involve sovereign immunity, discussion of the Eleventh Amendment is unneces-
sary.
142 City of New York v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 401 E Supp. 2d 244, 294 (E.D.N.Y. 2005).
143 Id.
144 See Jack B. Weinstein, Notes For a Discussion of Mass Tort Cases and Class Actions, 63
BROOK. L. REv. 58I (1997); see also Jack B. Weinstein & Eilenn Hershenov, The Effect of Equity
on Mass TortLaw, 1991 U. ILL. L. REV. 269 (1991); Jack B. Weinstein, Ethical Dilemmas in Mass
Tort Litigation, 88 Nw. U. L. REv. 469 (1993).
145 See In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 611 F Supp. 1223 (E.D.N.Y.), claim dis-
missed, 611 F. Supp. 1221 (E.D.N.Y. 1985), andaff'd, 818 E2d 187 (2d Cit. 1987); In rejoint E.
and S. Dist. Asbestos Litig., 129 B.R. 710 (E.D.N.Y. I99'), vacated on other grounds, 982 E2d
721 (2d Cit. 1992), modified on reh'g, 993 F.2d 7 (2d Cir. 1993).
146 See Shawn Zeller, Judge Takes a Shot at Gun Suit Ban, CONG. Q. WEEKLY, Dec. 10, 2005,
2005 WLNR 20363373.
147 Hamilton v. Accu-Tek, 62 F. Supp. 2d 802 (E.D.N.Y. 1999) (Weinstein J.) (allow-
ing plaintiff to assert claims of negligent marketing and market-share liability against gun
manufacturers), vacatedsub nom. Hamilton v. Beretta USA Corp., 264 F3d 21 (2d Cir. 2ooi).
Weinstein also upheld New York City's lawsuit in the Beretta case in what could be described
as a rather strained reading of the PLCAA.
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industry supporting the constitutionality of the PLCAA, the case for the
law's standing on firm constitutional grounds is strengthened. However,
Weinstein's unique views on the proper role of the federal government in
dealing with torts probably puts him outside the mainstream on the issue.'4"
Thus, Judge Weinstein's approval of the Act's constitutionality does not
settle the issue, but his analysis of the PLCAA, at least on the federalism
and judicial-congressional separations of powers issues, is persuasive. The
extensive treatment he provided the issue should be helpful on review.
Recent developments on the Supreme Court also point toward the con-
clusion of constitutionality. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice O'Connor,
considered leaders in the move to increase the importance of the states in
the federal system, are no longer on the Supreme Court. These two justices
authored the opinions in Morrison, Lopez, and New York; "4 9 and Rehnquist
authored the opinion in National League of Cities v. Usery,t"I the case cited
as beginning the move toward a larger role for the states in the federal
system.'' These justices were in the majority in nearly every other major
federalism decision that found in favor of limiting congressional power."2
Their absence could lead to a Court that is more deferential to congressio-
nal action that infringes upon state power.
Rehnquist and O'Connor have been replaced by Chief Justice John
Roberts and Justice Samuel Alito respectively. The current Roberts Court,
with Alito as a member, has yet to face a significant federalism decision.
In January of 2006, the Roberts Court, with O'Connor still a member, is-
sued two opinions on the federalism issue." 3 However, these two cases
148 See Charles T Kimmett, Rethinking Mass Tort Law, 105 YALE L.J. 1713 (1996) (review-
ing JACK B. WEINSTEIN, INDIVIDUAL JUSTICE IN MASS TORT LITIGATION: THE EFFECT OF CLASS
ACTIONS, CONSOLIDATIONS, AND OTHER MULTIPARTY DEVICES (1995)) (noting the high rate at
which appellate courts tend to reverse Weinstein's opinions).
149 United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2ooo); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549
(1995); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
15o Nat'l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), overruled by Garcia v. San Antonio
Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985), overruled in part, Seminole Tribe of Fl. v. Florida, 517
U.S. 44 (1996), asstatedin Palotai v. Univ. of Md. Coll. Park, 959 F Supp. 714 (D. Md. 1997), and
superseded by statute, Fair Labor Standards Act of 1985, 99 Stat. 787, as recognized in Franklin v.
City of Kettering, 246 F3d 531 (6th Cir. 2001).
151 Usery involved a challenge to the federal minimum wage law, in which the Court
held that determining the amount to pay state employees was a traditional state function
that was protected by the Tenth Amendment from federal regulation. Thus, states were not
required to pay the minimum wage. See Usery, 426 U.S. at 845. The holding in Usery was spe-
cifically overturned in Garcia, 469 U.S. at 557.
152 See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
153 See United States v. Georgia, 546 U.S. 151 (zoo6) (holding that Title II of the
Americans with Disabilities Act validly abrogates state Eleventh Amendment sovereign im-
munity when an actual violation of the Fourteenth Amendment is asserted); Cent. Va. Cmty.
Coll. v. Katz, 126 S. Ct. 990 (2oo6) (holding that a bankruptcy trustee's proceeding to set aside
the debtor's preferential transfers to state agencies is not barred by sovereign immunity).
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only dealt with an Eleventh Amendment challenge, not the Commerce
Clause or Tenth Amendment. As the PLCAA does not implicate the Elev-
enth Amendment, these decisions do not provide any real guidance as to
how the Supreme Court might rule on a challenge to the PLCAA.
It appears that Justice Alito's position on the federalism issue will not
differ considerably from that of Rehnquist and O'Connor. While he was
questioned briefly on the issue at his confirmation hearings, his answers did
not reveal how he would approach the issue as a Supreme Court Justice. 5 a
However, one opinion authored by Alito while he was a member of the
Third Circuit reveals that he is willing to subject congressional action un-
der the Commerce Clause to scrutiny. In that case, United States v. Rybar,155
Alito dissented from a decision upholding a federal prohibition on machine
gun possession. Citing Lopez, he noted that the law at issue in Rybar at-
tempted to regulate an activity without providing a method for determin-
ing whether the particular gun had traveled in interstate commerce." 6 Not-
ing the close similarity between the laws in Rybar and Lopez, Alito wrote
that by failing to adhere to the Supreme Court's guidance, the Rybar court
had relegated Lopez to the status of a "constitutional freak." '57
Alito could be a crucial fifth vote on federalism cases, as the Court has
been deeply divided on one of the federalism decisions it has made to
date. "'58 Whatever his particular approach to the issue may be, the PLCAA
remains likely to survive scrutiny, as it appears constitutional even under
the most aggressively pro-state federalism decisions of the Rehnquist
Court.
IV. THE PLCAA AS A MODEL FOR FUTURE FEDERAL TORT REFORM
Congress is likely to continue its attempts to increase federal control over
the area of tort law. Various tort reform measures have been enacted in the
past decade,"59 and several more are pending."6 As long as perceptions of
154 Tony Mauro, Alito's Vague Testimony Contains Reaganesque Overtones, LEGAL
INTELLIGENCER, Jan. 18, 2oo6, at 4, available atWestlaw 1/18/2oo6 TLI 4 (recounting an ex-
change at the confirmation hearings in which Judge Alito was questioned about advice he
gave as a lawyer at the Justice Department advocating a policy of federalism).
155 United States v. Rybar, 103 E3d 273 (3d Cir. 1996).
156 Id. at 287 (Alito, J., dissenting).
157 Id. at 286.
158 Katz, 126 S. Ct. at 990 (5-4 decision); see also Linda Greenhouse, Justices Curb States'
Immunity From Suit, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 24, 2oo6, atA 16 (discussing the continued division of the
Court on federalism issues and the potential influence of Alito on those decisions).
159 See Grey, supra note 12o, at n.2 (cataloging the recent federal tort legislation).
16o Among the more controversial are likely to be laws similar to the following from 2005:
the Lawsuit Abuse Reduction Act (LARA), H.R. 420, 1o9th Cong. (2005), and the Personal
Responsibility in Food Consumption Act, H.R. 554, 1o9th Cong. (2005) (commonly known
as the "Cheeseburger Bill"). LARA is an attempt to reduce "forum shopping" by plaintiff
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unfairness and inefficiency in the tort system persist, pressure to continue
its federalization is unlikely to decrease. Particularly, certain interests will
seek either general protection from lawsuits, or a cap on certain types of
damages. This movement toward federalization is likely to be met with
increasing opposition from those that view it as an interference with the
traditional power of the states.
Advocates of federalizing the tort system should take note of the fea-
tures of the PLCAA that support its constitutionality against federalism
challenges. One crucial feature is the development of a record demonstrat-
ing that the industry benefiting from the legislation is national in character
and actively involved in interstate commerce, as recent Commerce Clause
cases have emphasized the importance of such evidence. 61 The necessity
for reform of the civil justice system to protect the industry must also be a
primary motivation. In this way, the law will limit itself to regulating in the
economic, rather than the normative or moral, sphere and thus not intrude
on state power. 6 This was certainly the case for the PLCAA. The find-
ings and legislative history of the Act display a preeminent concern for the
industry's ongoing viability. 163
Concern with the economic fate of an industry is clearly a proper moti-
vation for federal tort reform. However, the means by which industries are
protected from liability will be crucial in determining whether future tort
reform laws run afoul of federalism principles. In the rush to protect indus-
tries, a tempting solution is to simply enact caps on punitive damages. This
solution is dangerous because caps implicate an area of traditional state
concern to a greater extent than do measures such as the PLCAA. As Pro-
fessor Betsy J. Grey has noted, punitive damages are based on notions of
normative disapproval and deterrence of future inappropriate behavior."6
In this way, she argues, punitive damages are more akin to sentencing in
the criminal process. 165 Since recent federalism decisions have consistently
held the criminal law, and those areas of the law dealing with moral issues,
to be almost the exclusive realm of the states, it is obvious how damage
caps could create potential federalism problems.
attorneys who file suit in venues with only a tenuous connection to the litigation. LARA
purports to control both federal and state proceedings, and it could therefore create some
federalism concerns. These concerns may possibly be allayed by a provision in the bill that
limits its applicability to suits in which the subject matter involves interstate commerce. The
Cheeseburger Bill would prevent any civil liability action in which the injury alleged was the
plaintiff's obesity or weight gain caused by food consumption. Its structure is very similar to
that of the PLCAA. Both bills have been passed by large margins in the House and are cur-
rently awaiting action in the Senate.
16I Seesupra notes i1o-i8 and accompanying text.
162 See supra notes 122-26 and accompanying text.
163 See supra notes 34-39 and accompanying text.
164 Grey, supra note 12o, at 533.
165 Id.
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2oo6-2007] IMMUNITY FOR THE FIREARM INDUSTRY
The PLCAA, along with efforts to aid aircraft manufacturers,"6 the air-
line industry generally, 67 and the vaccine industry,68 provides future pro-
ponents of federal tort reform with models for success. In addition to focus-
ing on the economic and interstate nature of the legislation and developing
a detailed record, future legislation should avoid dealing with damage caps.
These caps implicate areas of traditional state sovereignty to the extent
that the unconstitutionality of the legislation becomes a distinct possibil-
ity.169 Focusing on the protection of industry is crucial to the success of
these tort reform measures, as this places the emphasis on Congress's func-
tion in regulating interstate commerce rather than on its disapproval with
the existing tort law of the states. If these recommendations are followed,
future efforts at federal tort reform will stand on firm constitutional foot-
ing.
CONCLUSION
The case for the constitutionality of the PLCAA in light of separation of
powers and federalism is strong. While directing courts to take specific ac-
tion and dismiss pending lawsuits, it does not represent an encroachment
on the judiciary by Congress. The law certainly increases the relative pow-
er of Congress to regulate the tort system. However, as the purposes and
effects of the law are national and economic in nature, it does not run afoul
of recent federalism jurisprudence. Such a conclusion is supported by the
rulings of two lower federal courts, which have upheld the PLCAA against
constitutional challenges. 70 But given the level of hostility the Act has cre-
166 General Aviation Revitalization Act of 1994 (GARA), io8 Stat. 1552 (codified as
amended at 49 U.S.C. § 40101 (zooo)). This Act was passed in order to protect manufacturers
of small aircraft from potentially ruinous liability. It essentially created a statute of repose
for the industry, barring all claims against it for a certain number of years. GARA, along with
the statutes cited in notes 145 and 146 supra, were cited approvingly by the court in City of
New Yorkv. Beretta USA Corp., 401 F. Supp. zd z44 (E.D.N.Y. zoo5). For further discussion of
GARA, including a defense of its constitutionality under many of the same challenges faced
by the PLCAA, see Victor E. Schwartz & Leah Lorber, The GeneralAviation Revitalization Act:
How Rational Civil Justice Reform Revitalized an Industry, 67 J. AIR L. & CoM. 1269 (2002); see
also James F. Rodriguez, Note, Tort Reform & GARA: Is Repose Incompatible With Safety?, 47 ARIz.
L. REv. 577 (2005).
167 Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act of zoo, 115 Star. 230 (codi-
fied at 49 U.S.C.A. § 40101, 44302-o6 (West Supp. zoo6)). This law created a strict liability
cause of action for all claims arising from the September 1, 2001 terrorist attacks and limited
airline liability. Like the PLCAA and GARA, this act emphasized the importance of the indus-
try to the national economy and the potentially ruinous effect of liability.
168 National Vaccine Program, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 3ooaa-1 to -6 (West Supp. zoo6).
169 It is not the position of this Note that damage caps are unconstitutional. Instead, it
only raises the issue that damage caps, especially those involving punitive damages, appear to
intrude on the traditional realm of state sovereignty.
170 See supra note 45.
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ated among supporters of gun control and advocates of firearm victims, the
constitutionality of the Act is likely to continue to come under fire. The
next important word on the Act's constitutionality will likely come from
the Courts of Appeal.
If, as this Note predicts, the higher courts find the law a valid exercise
of congressional power, the PLCAA will serve as a helpful model for proper
reform of the civil justice system. The bill effectively accomplishes its goal
of protecting a key national industry without disrupting core constitutional
principles of state sovereignty or judicial independence. It demonstrates
how Congress can act decisively on an important issue, while staying with-
in the bounds of the constitutional limitations on its power.
